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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD), due to inconclusive results from DoD source selection 
evaluation teams (SSETs), is vulnerable to selecting contractors that are not offering the best 
value to the government. Cryptic SSET results, furthermore, render the DoD’s acquisition 
process susceptible to corruption, thus endangering the DoD’s reputation as well as the 
careers and freedom of DoD military and civilian personnel. The DoD’s source selection 
directives in DFARS Subpart 215.3, Source Selection, appear to be skillfully and 
professionally written. In actuality, however, there are weaknesses that contribute to cryptic 
SSET results. The DoD’s prohibition against numerically weighing proposal evaluation factors 
and prohibition against assigning numerical scores to subjectively rated factors contribute to 
ambiguous SSET results, provide insufficient transparency, and render the process 
susceptible to fraud. This paper describes instances of contract corruption by government 
officials, provides accolades and criticisms of the DoD source selection principles and 
procedures, and recommends changes to clearly identify contractors offering best value to 
the government. Implementation of the recommendations presented here will remove 
ambiguity from the SSET, improve transparency, and reduce opportunities for corrupt officials 
to prosper through nefarious acts. 
Introduction 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) principles and procedures for selecting 
contractors when conducting negotiated, competitive acquisitions are contained in DFARS 
subpart 215-3, Source Selection. The scope of subpart 215.300 refers contracting officers to 
the provisions of a memorandum from the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy (Director) for conducting such acquisitions. The memorandum, dated March 4, 2011, 
has the subject line “Department of Defense Source Selection Procedures.” The mandatory 
principles and procedures contained in this memorandum, as expected, appear to constitute 
a well conceived process for evaluating contractor proposals received in response to 
requests for proposals (RFPs). The purpose, roles, and responsibilities for acquisition 
officials are well defined and clearly stated. Pre-solicitation activities are, likewise, logical 
and clearly communicated. One recommended additional provision regarding 
communications during the pre-proposal phase of the contracting cycle, however, is offered 
in this paper. The proposal evaluation and decision process required by provisions of the 
Director’s memorandum also portray the initial impression of judicious design to guide the 
SSET in selecting the contractor offering the best value to the government. A critical 
evaluation of the process and restrictions in the manner for scoring proposals, however, 
reveals that the provisions are susceptible to the formulation of cryptic SSET results, less 
than the desired degree of transparency, and corruption of the contractor selection process. 
This paper highlights commendable aspects of current policies and procedures, provides 
examples of contract malfeasance to demonstrate the existence of chicanery in government 
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contracting, illustrates weaknesses in present policies and procedures, describes the 
recommended process for evaluating proposals, illustrates how implementation of the 
recommended evaluation method will identify the contractor offering the best value, and 
offers additional recommendations. The appendices to the Director’s memorandum, 
Appendix A, Lowest Pride Technically Acceptable Source Selection Process, and Appendix 
B, Debriefing Guide, are not addressed in this paper. 
Commendable Aspects of Current Practices 
The direction provided to DoD personnel for evaluating proposals and selecting the 
contractor offering the best value to the government is professionally written and excels in 
its statement of goals and the qualifications for personnel involved in source selection 
activities. The roles and responsibilities of the parties participating in the selection of the 
best qualified contractor are clearly and intelligently prescribed. The explanation of activities 
undertaken prior to issuance of a solicitation to prospective contractors is exceptional. 
Although there is no discussion of activities following release of the solicitation and the 
receipt of proposals, the discussion of the evaluation of proposals is, again, thorough and 
clear. Direction is provided for every party involved in the contractor selection process. 
Exception is taken here to the method for weighing the importance of factors and subfactors 
(future reference to factors should be considered as reference to both factors and 
subfactors) as well as to the prescribed methodology for scoring the proposal evaluation 
factors. Despite the exceptions taken here to certain DoD contractor selection policies and 
procedures, the overall content of the directions for selecting DoD contractors is superb. 
Examples of Contract Malfeasance 
Instances of DoD military and civilian personnel becoming embroiled in contract 
corruption have appeared repeatedly in the media for decades. One recent contract 
corruption investigation involving the selling of classified information for sex, money, and 
other gratuities resulted in the contractor, Glenn Defense Marine Asia, allegedly being 
positioned to overcharge the Navy millions of dollars for ship repairs (Whitlock, 2013). The 
account of the investigation indicates that despite the Singapore Senate’s criticism of the 
contractor for dumping untreated sewage near Subic Bay and competing contractors 
complaining for years to the Navy about unfair business practices, Glenn Defense Marine 
Asia was awarded a $1 million no-bid contract extension. The investigation revealed 
weaknesses in the Navy’s contracting practices worldwide. Competing contractors 
complained that Glenn Defense Marine Asia quoted prices so low that, in addition to not 
making profit, the prices would not have covered the contractor’s expenses. Contract 
loopholes, as reported in the referenced article, permitted the contractor to compensate for 
low proposed prices by overcharging the Navy millions of dollars for maintenance and 
repairs. The overcharging was allegedly facilitated by Navy personnel who provided the 
contractor with classified information regarding the location of naval vessels. As of the date 
of the article, seven senior Navy officials were charged, suspended, or placed on leave. The 
Navy reportedly expects additional personnel to be disciplined in this case. 
One of the more disturbing contract corruption cases involved one of the Navy’s 
highly decorated heroes of the Vietnam War (Spagat, 2013). Following his distinguished 
naval career which included becoming the first ace of the Vietnam War, being awarded the 
Navy Cross, a Silver Star with one oak leaf cluster, and the Purple Heart, he served as a 
member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1991 to 2005. Randall Cunningham, 
however, pled guilty to steering government contracts to contractors in exchange for bribes 
including a luxury house, Rolls Royce, and other expensive gifts. One former contractor, 
Brent Wilkes, was convicted of bribing Cunningham with cash and gifts valued at over 
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$700,000 in exchange for almost $90 million in DoD contracts. The AP report indicates that 
Wilkes is not serving time while he awaits an appeal of his conviction. Another former 
contractor, Mitchell Wade, served time in prison after pleading guilty to providing 
Cunningham with over $1 million in gratuities, including a yacht, in exchange for 
approximately $150 million in government contracts. Although the value of the gifts 
Cunningham received from the two former contractors was approximately $1,700,000, that 
amount was eclipsed by the $240 million in contracts that became a liability for taxpayers. 
This taxpayer obligation is especially egregious when one considers that during sentencing 
arguments, Assistant U.S. Attorney Phil Halpern stated that while Cunningham was living 
the good life, “he … was squandering precious tax dollars for, among other things, systems 
the military didn’t ask for, didn’t need and frequently didn’t use” (“Ex-Congressman,” 2006). 
Weaknesses in Policies and Procedures 
In preparation for writing a book on government contracting (Curry, 2014), protests 
over a two-year period that were sustained by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
were studied to determine the rationale for sustaining the protests. Knowledge of the bases 
for the GAO sustained protests is key to identifying reasons for the federal government’s 
failure to consistently meet its goal (FAR, 2014) to select the proposal offering the best 
value to the government. Infractions discovered while conducting the research are identified 
below in descending order of frequency (indicated in parenthesis): 
 Errors Made in Proposal Evaluation Process (50) 
 Deficiencies in Determining Acceptable Proposal (16) 
 Socioeconomic Contracting Irregularities (15) 
 Irregularities during Discussions/Negotiations (8) 
 Conflicts of Interest (1) 
 Contract Award Irregularities (1) 
In addition to the reasons cited by the GAO, matrices reflecting SSET results for all 
federal government agencies were observed in 20 of the 65 protests reviewed during the 
research project. Although the acquisitions were not all performed by DoD agencies, the 
federal acquisition offices involved frequently followed the DoD’s lead in displaying the 
SSET results in matrices containing adjectival or color ratings for factors. In two of the 20 
cases, the contractor offering the best value was identified. In the other 18 cases, however, 
the matrices displayed inconclusive results regarding which contractor offered the best 
value.  
The two primary weaknesses in the DoD’s efforts to identify the best value proposal 
stem from restrictions against using numerical values to score proposals and against 
numerical values to weigh the importance of proposal evaluation factors. The argument 
opposing the restriction against using numerical values to score proposals will be divided 
between factors that are subjectively rated and factors that are objectively rated.  
With respect to the restriction against using numerical values to score subjectively 
rated factors, consider the matrix, found in the GAO (2008) protest decision, reflecting the 
SSET’s evaluation of proposals for the Air Force’s aerial refueling tanker, shown in Table 1, 
Actual Proposal Rating for Aerial Refueling Tanker. 
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Table 1. Actual Proposal Rating for Aerial Refueling Tanker 
 
The actual adjectival and color ratings reflected in Table 1 reflect tied or virtually tied 
scores for each factor thus resulting in obscure results from the SSET. An examination of 
the SSET’s findings in the previously cited GAO (2008) decision, however, indicates that the 
SSET members discerned distinct differences in the contractors’ proposals for the evaluated 
factors. Indicators of this discernment of differences in the evaluation of factors are provided 
in the statements below that were taken from the referenced GAO (2008) decision: 
Ultimately, the SSAC [source selection advisory council] concluded, however, 
that Northrop Grumman’s proposal was more advantageous to the agency 
than Boeing’s under the mission capability, past performance, cost/price, and 
IFARA factors; the two firms were found to be essentially equal under the 
proposal risk factor. 
Northrop Grumman’s evaluated advantage under the mission 
capability factor was largely based upon the firm’s perceived superiority 
under the key system requirements and program management subfactors; 
the two firms were found essentially equal under the remaining three 
subfactors. 
In the aerial refueling area, the SSAC noted “major discriminators” in 
favor of Boeing under several KPP [key performance parameters] No. 1 
objectives, including its capability to [Deleted], and for a noteworthy non-
KPP/KSA [key performance parameters/key system attributes] capability to 
[Deleted]. 
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The SSAC also noted a number of “major discriminators” in favor of 
Northrop Grumman in the aerial refueling area, including one under the KPP 
NO. 2 objective for Northrop Grumman’s proposal to exceed the RFP’s fuel 
offload versus unrefueled radius range (Boeing’s aircraft was also evaluated 
as exceeding this KPP objective but to a lesser degree), … and for a number 
of non-KPP/KSA requirements, including the proposal of a better aerial 
refueling efficiency (more pounds of fuel offload per pound of fuel used) than 
Boeing’s; a “boom envelope” that was [Deleted] times greater than that 
defined by the Allied Technical Publication (ATP)-56-[23] (Boeing proposed a 
boom envelope that was [Deleted] times greater than that defined by the 
publication); and a higher offload and received fuel rate than Boeing. …  
In the aerial refueling area, the SSAC also identified five 
“discriminators offering less benefit” for Boeing that were assessed under 14 
different SRD [systems requirement documents] requirements and one such 
discriminator for Northrop Grumman that was assessed under 2 SRD 
requirements. … 
The GAO decision continued by describing numerous other distinctions between the 
Northrop Grumman and the Boeing proposals. Recall, however, that the matrix summarizing 
the scoring of the two proposals (see Table 1) reflects virtual ties between the competing 
contractors for all factors. 
The present methodology restricts the rating for subjectively rated factors to an 
adjective, such as excellent or outstanding, or a color, such as blue or green, for all 
proposals fitting the narrative for the particular color or adjective. Sophisticated DoD 
contractors are likely to submit proposals meeting the highest standards for many, if not all, 
factors. Although SSET members are likely to discern a hierarchy of ratings between the 
competing contractors, they are presently forced to assign identical adjectival or color scores 
to each contractor’s proposal. The tied scores, despite the discernment of such a hierarchy 
in the merits of competing proposals, are demonstrated in Table 1. 
During the research into protests sustained by the GAO, discussed earlier, it was 
noted that objectively rated factors were occasionally given adjectival or color scores. 
Factors that can be rated objectively, however, would be better understood if the decision 
matrix reflected the actual numerical value proposed by the contractor or as recalculated for 
reasonableness by the government. Another problem with adjectival and color scores 
assigned to objectively rated factors is that calculations cannot be performed to characterize 
the scores on an equivalent basis, including the ability to convert low values to high scores 
for factors, such as cost/price, that are favorable with low values. The value of converting 
scores is discussed later in this paper.  
With respect to the restriction against using numerical values to weigh the 
importance of proposal evaluation factors, consider the present method for reflecting the 
significance of factors by inclusion of a statement in the solicitation such as the following 
from the GAO’s decision regarding a protest of the contractor selection for the Air Force’s 
aerial refueling tankers: 
… mission capability, proposal risk, and past performance factors were of 
equal importance and individually more important than the cost/price or 
IFARA [integrated fleet aerial refueling assessment] factors, and that the 
cost/price and IFARA factors were of equal importance. The subfactors within 
the mission capability factor were stated to be of descending order of 
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importance. … Proposal risk would only be assessed at the mission capability 
subfactor level and for only the first four subfactors. (GAO, 2008) 
The primary weakness of this statement of relative values is that the values for the 
evaluation factors are subject to manipulation during the proposal evaluation process. A 
corrupt official might assign greater weight than originally envisioned to factors where a 
favored contractor is strong while lesser weight might be assigned to factors where 
competing contractors are strong. 
The restrictions against using numerical values to score factors and to determine the 
significance of evaluation factors place unreasonable limitations on the evaluation process. 
Should these restrictions against using numerical values be eliminated, the SSET results 
would more clearly define the contractor offering the proposal representing the best value to 
the government, improve transparency in the evaluation process, and remove the obscurity 
of SSET results, thereby minimizing the introduction of opportunities to corrupt the 
contractor selection process.  
Recommended Process for Evaluating Proposals 
Rather than resorting to the depiction of the SSET’s findings through a confusing 
matrix containing numbers that may be favorable either if high or low, colors, or adjectives, 
identification of the contractor offering the best value is recommended through calculation of 
a combined numerical score that distinctly identifies the contractor proposing the best mix of 
factors meeting the government’s needs. Just as with the present process for rating 
proposals, however, it is necessary to first determine what factors will be measured and how 
they should be measured. Continuance of the present practice of documenting the rationale 
for ratings assigned to factors contemporaneously with the evaluation of proposals is also 
recommended. 
The memorandum from the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(Director), referenced in the Introduction, prohibits numerical scoring of proposals and 
numerical weighting of evaluation factors. These restrictions against numerical proposal 
scoring and factor weighting are the greatest contributors to cryptic results from SSETs. The 
recommendations to avoid cryptic SSET results and distinctly identify the best value 
proposal include the assignment of numerical scores for subjectively rated factors and use 
of proposed numerical values, or values recalculated for reasonableness when appropriate, 
for objectively rated factors. The numerical weighting of evaluation factors is also included in 
the recommended process for evaluating proposals. A series of equations was developed to 
convert the numerical scores to a common basis such that high scores are favorable for all 
factors and to weigh the scores according to the significance of the factors to the 
government. An example of converting numerical scores to a common basis wherein low 
values are favorable to the government is the conversion of cost/price to render low 
proposed amounts for cost/price to high scores. Once the scores are converted such that 
they can be compared on an equivalent basis and weighed according to their importance to 
the agency, all factor scores can be added with the proposal having the highest combined 
score being the proposal offering the best value to the agency. 
The values recommended here for subjectively rated factors fall in a range of 70 to 
100 as follows: 
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Score range Narrative description of factor rating      
 90–100 Factor meets all and significantly exceeds numerous expectations 
 80–89 Factor meets all and exceeds several expectations 
 70–79 Factor meets minimum expectations 
One advantage of using a range of scores for subjectively rated factors, as shown 
above, rather than colors or adjectives, is that proposal evaluators are likely to discern a 
hierarchy of ratings for individual factors within the adjectival or color category from each 
contractor’s proposals. When adjectival or color ratings are mandated, evaluators must 
show tied scores, such as outstanding or blue, for all factors that “meet all and significantly 
exceed numerous expectations.” When numerical ratings are permitted, discerned 
differences can be portrayed through scores ranging from 90 to 100. 
In addition to converting cost/price to high values, certain other objective criteria 
might also be more favorable to the government with low values. For example, the lowest 
temperature in which a system can operate is obviously more favorable to the government 
when lower operating temperatures are likely to be experienced. The formula developed for 
converting low cost/price amounts to high values and weighing the values to reflect the 
significance of such factors is the same formula for converting scores for factors such as low 
operating temperature. That formula shall be referred to as the formula for “objective 
factor—low numbers are favorable.” A complete list of the factor types for which equations 
have been developed is shown in Table 2, Types of Factors and Formulae.  
Table 2. Types of Factors and Formulae 
Type of Factors Formulae 
Subjective factors - high numbers favorable S = W(R/HR) 
Objective factors - high numbers favorable S = V/(HO/W) 
Objective factors - low numbers favorable S = HO-(V-L)/(HO/W) 
Objective factors with an optimal value 
     (Ascending section of line) 
     (Descending section of line) 
 
S = V/(OV/W) 
S = (OV – (V – OV))/(OV/W) 
Objective factors with a suboptimal value 
     (Descending section of line) 
     (Ascending section of line) 
 
S = SV – (V – LVL)/(SV/W) 
S = SV – (HVL – V)/(SV/W) 
Where: 
 HO  =  Highest observed value 
 HR  =  Highest possible subjective rating 
 HVL  =  High value limit 
 L  =  Lowest observed value 
 LVL  =  Low value limit 
 OV  =  Optimal value 
 R  =  Actual subjective rating 
 S  =  Weighed score 
 SV  =  Suboptimal value 
 V  =  Observed value 
 W  =  Criterion weight 
Illustrating Identification of the Best Value Proposal 
To support this recommended approach in the face of potential arguments against 
numerical factor ratings and weighting, a similar process was implemented and is in use for 
evaluating proposals by at least seven states, two large cities, and one large university. 
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While these state and local government agencies should be commended for using an 
advanced proposal rating schema, their process contains a slight flaw. The flaw emanates 
from an anomalous equation used for converting low scores to high values. The formula for 
converting objectively rated factors where low values are favorable, depicted in Table 2, 
does not contain this anomaly. Although the anomaly is sufficiently obscure that it remained 
unnoticed for years, it could result in selection of a less than optimal contractor in highly 
competitive procurements. Despite the flaw, however, their process is considered superior to 
the DoD’s process involving scoring matrices that display a confusing patchwork of 
adjectives, colors, and numbers that oftentimes fail to identify the proposal offering the best 
value.  
Since factor weights and the proposal scoring process need to be revealed in the 
solicitation, it is not possible to introduce numerical weighing and scoring processes after-
the-fact and expect to identify the contractor that offered the superior proposal. The 
information gleaned from the GAO report with respect to factor weights and discerned 
differences by the SSET in the Boeing/Northrop Grumman case can, however, be converted 
to numerical values to demonstrate how the recommended methodology for weighing 
evaluation factors and scoring proposals would remove ambiguity from the SSET results. 
Factor weights, in this example, were constructed based on the importance of the factors as 
described in the solicitation. The adjectival and color scores were converted to numerical 
scores based on the SSET’s discernment of differences in the proposal scoring as depicted 
in the GAO decision. The numerical scores were then weighed according to their importance 
and low numbers were converted, when appropriate, to high values so that all factor scores 
could be evaluated on an equivalent basis. Table 1 was then reconfigured to reflect the 
factor weights and the numerical scoring in Table 3, Revised Proposal Rating with Weighted 
Numerical Ratings for Aerial Refueling Tanker.  
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Table 3. Revised Proposal Rating With Weighted Numerical Ratings for Aerial 
Refueling Tanker 
 
MPLCC = Most Probable Life Cycle Cost 
IFARA = Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment 
SDD = System Development and Demonstration 
The combined total score of 109.8 for Northrop Grumman in Table 3 indicates that 
this contractor best meets the criteria established by the agency. This representation of the 
SSET’s evaluation of proposals offers a distinctly clearer identification of the contractor 
offering the best value to the agency than the Table 1 representation that reflects virtually 
tied scores, leaving the SSA with flexibility to justify award to either contractor. In one of 
those rare instances where the SSA is subject to corruptibility, the present method for 
expressing the importance of evaluation factors in relative terms and scoring factors with 
adjectives or colors facilitates the fraudulent award of contracts. 
The GAO (2011a) decision regarding the sustaining of a protest filed by Solers, 
Incorporated further illustrates problems associated with identifying the contractor offering 
the best value to the government. The procuring agency in the Solers case was the DoD 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Although, as with the Air Force’s aerial 
refueling tanker procurement, the GAO sustained the protest on numerous grounds and did 
not specifically identify the cryptic SSET results. Indicators contained in the GAO decision, 
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however, further support a process to more definitively determine the contractor offering the 
best value consistent with the scoring and weighing of criteria established by the 
government. According to the GAO decision, DISA stated the importance of the factors in 
the solicitation as follows: 
The technical factor was more important than the management factor, and these two 
factors were, combined, more important than the two past performance factors. For 
purposes of award, the non-price factors were “significantly more important” than price. 
(GAO, 2011a) 
The matrix reflecting DISA’s scoring of the proposals from Solers and Booz Allen 
Hamilton, Inc. (BAH) is provided in Table 4.  
Table 4. Solers/BAH Decision Matrix 
 SOLERS BAH 
Technical Blue/Low Risk Green/Moderate Risk 
Management Blue/Low Risk Blue/Low Risk 
Past Performance Confidence Satisfactory Substantial 
Past Performance Relevancy Relevant Very Relevant 
Price/Cost $27,419,622.57 $24,586,719.75 
The GAO (2011a) decision included the following narrative characterizing the CO’s 
decision: 
The Contracting Officer (CO) served as the source selection authority for the 
procurement. The CO found that “[a]lthough the Solers proposal was rated 
technically superior to BAH’s proposal, the identified strengths do not warrant 
payment of an approximate 12% higher price.” … The CO concluded that 
BAH should be selected for award based on the following rationale: “Based 
on the technical sufficiency of the [BAH] proposal, the superior past 
performance, and the lower cost, the Government recommends awarding the 
contract to [BAH].” 
The data in the Table 4 decision matrix does not, however, unequivocally identify 
Solers as the contractor offering the best value proposal. The CO’s conclusion stated as 
“the identified strengths do not warrant payment of an approximate 12% higher price” 
[emphasis added] could have, based on the decision matrix data, just as well have favored 
award to BAH by stating that the identified strengths do warrant payment of a price higher 
by approximately 12%. Recall that DISA’s statement regarding the importance of the factors 
reads, “For purposes of award, the non-price factors were “significantly more important” than 
price.” The combination of adjectival scores and relative values representing the importance 
of the evaluation factors results in a decision matrix that could just as convincingly support 
contract award to either BAH or Solers. Had DISA used numerical scoring and weighting of 
the factors in this case, as recommended here, the decision matrix would have clearly 
identified the contractor proposing the best value to the government. 
Additional Recommendations 
Although the use of numerical scoring and weighting of factors is recommended 
here, it is not recommended that the government rely solely on numerical scoring. When 
evaluating factors, it is recommended that the proposal evaluation process be documented 
contemporaneously with the evaluation of proposals through use of a form similar to the one 
illustrated in Figure 1, Source Selection Evaluation Team Factor or Subfactor Rating. 
Creating narrative records contemporaneously with the evaluation of each factor is a 
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recommended practice. With respect to documenting the proposal evaluation process, GAO 
decisions have historically included statements regarding the need to contemporaneously 
document proposal evaluations similar to the following: 
Next, our review of the record reveals that the agency failed to adequately 
document its resolution of weaknesses and risks in several areas of the 
technical evaluation. Specifically, under the platform integration sub-element 
and size and weight sub-element of the design approach subfactor, the 
evaluation documents contain risks and weaknesses that were attributed to 
Raytheon’s proposal, were not resolved, but nonetheless disappeared from 
the evaluation record without contemporaneous documentation. Although an 
agency is not required to retain every document generated during its 
evaluation of proposals, the agency’s evaluation must be sufficiently 
documented to allow our Office to review the merits of a protest. (GAO, 2013) 
Implementation of the form illustrated in Figure 1 will also address other weaknesses 
in the federal government’s acquisition process. The weaknesses were discovered during 
an evaluation of protests sustained by the GAO over a two-year period that was conducted 
in preparation for writing a government contracting book (Curry, 2014). The acquisition 
infractions discovered during the review of sustained protests addressed through 
implementation of this form are listed following Figure 1. 
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 Source Selection Evaluation Team Factor or Subfactor Rating 
Proposal Evaluation Weaknesses Addressed Through Figure 1, Source 
Selection Evaluation Team Factor or Subfactor Rating: 
 Failure to evaluate proposals according to the terms of the solicitation. This 
weakness is addressed by repeating the description of the factor or subfactor 
in the Description of Factor or Subfactor From the RFP section exactly as it 
appears in the solicitation. 
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 Failure to document evaluation of proposals concurrently with the proposal 
evaluation efforts. Completing this form during the proposal evaluation 
process will resolve this failure. 
 Improper rejection of proposals that were submitted on time 
 Failure to reject proposals not submitted on time 
 Failure to determine whether the proposal meets all solicitation requirements 
 Failure to document determination as to whether the proposal was 
acceptable or unacceptable 
 Failure to offer all contractors the opportunity to address proposal 
deficiencies 
 Failure to conduct all required negotiations/discussions 
 Failure to document reason for determining that a proposal is unacceptable 
 Failure to evaluate proposals according to the terms of the solicitation is also 
addressed in the Rating Method section of the form by repeating the rating 
method exactly as it appears in the solicitation. 
 Failure to record the contractors’ strengths with respect to each factor 
 Failure to record the contractors’ weaknesses with respect to each factor 
The memorandum from the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
mentioned in the Introduction, transitions from pre-solicitation activities, Chapter 2, to 
evaluation and decision process, Chapter 3. There is, however, an overlooked critical phase 
in the acquisition cycle between pre-solicitation activities and the evaluation of proposals. 
This activity shall be referred to here as the pre-proposal phase. While the contractors are 
the parties primarily engaged in activities through preparation of their proposals, DoD 
personnel are responsible for managing pre-proposal communications to ensure that 
contractors are treated equally while they prepare their proposals. Answering questions 
directly to an individual contractor in response to a seemingly innocent query, could give the 
contractor posing the question a competitive advantage over other contractors. One 
example of such a competitive advantage, although not necessarily innocent, during the pre-
proposal stage of the contracting cycle occurred during an acquisition by the Army Corps of 
Engineers (GAO, 2011b). In this instance, an Army official who was transitioning to the 
private sector was offered a position with the parent company of a contractor that was 
competing for a contract to be awarded by his agency. In response to a query from that 
subsidiary company, the retiring Army official advised the subsidiary company 
representative that it could offer a price lower than the budgeted price. The solicitation, 
however, indicated that there would be no advantage to offering a price lower than the 
budgeted amount. A statement in the solicitation advised prospective contractors that 
offering a lower price would subject their company to a penalty. The Source Selection 
Authority for the Army Corps of Engineers cited the lower price as a reason for selecting the 
subsidiary company for contract award. The decision was protested based on this 
communication and other irregularities. The GAO sustained the protest. 
The recommended method for managing pre-proposal communications and treating 
contractors on an equal basis is to require all contractors to pose questions via e-mail to one 
agency official, designated in the solicitation, by a specified date (e.g., two weeks prior to 
the date that proposals are due). This date is suggested to permit the agency sufficient time 
to prepare agency responses to contractor questions by a certain date (e.g., approximately 
one week before proposals are due). It is further recommended that the agency establish a 
website for responses, also identified in the solicitation, where all contractor questions and 
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agency responses are posted. Implementation of these recommendations will ensure that all 
contractor questions and agency responses are identical and available to all prospective 
contractors at the same time. 
Conclusion 
The DoD’s source selection procedures prohibit the use of numerical values 
assigned to reflect the importance of the proposal evaluation factors and prohibit numerical 
rating of the merits of proposals submitted by prospective contractors. This prohibition 
against using numerical values results in inconclusive results from source selection 
evaluation teams (SSETs) and a failure to identify the contractor offering the best value, and 
renders the DoD source selection process vulnerable to fraud. The failure to adequately 
manage pre-proposal communications and failure to adequately document the SSET’s 
scoring rationale contemporaneously with proposal evaluation are also serious weaknesses 
in the DoD’s contractor selection process. Implementation of the recommendations offered 
in this paper to address all the noted shortcomings would result in a pragmatic approach to 
the selection of government contractors, improve the probability of selecting the contractor 
offering the best value to the government, and lessen the present vulnerability to contract 
fraud. 
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